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ABSTRACT 
Both Ireland and Taiwan are considered to have experienced “economic 
miracles” that, ex ante, could not have been predicted when the two countries 
started along the road of industrial development in the late 1940s / early 1950s 
through to the end of the 1960s. Taking the view that industrial development does 
not appear as a ready formed institution, as an essence that always-already existed, 
what is of interest in this paper is the work of institutionalizing or 
institutionalization as an on-going process. Accordingly, and through the lens of 
actor-network theory (ANT), the paper follows how both countries 
structured/organized themselves to facilitate, encourage and achieve industrial 
development in practice.  





                                                 
 This paper is a work in progress and constructive feedback is very much welcomed. I am grateful to the Taiwan 
Fellowship, funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has made possible my research in Taiwan. I am also 
grateful to the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, for hosting me throughout my time in Taiwan. 
 Research Fellow, College of Business, Dublin Institute of Technology, Ireland 
Email: paul.donnelly@dit.ie 
Institutionalizing Industrial Development:The Cases of Ireland and Taiwan 1 
 
Institutionalizing Industrial Development: 
The Cases of Ireland and Taiwan 
Introduction 
Both Ireland and Taiwan are considered to have experienced “economic miracles” worthy of 
attention for how they managed to bring about economic/industrial development. Former colonies, by 
the late 1940s, neither was particularly well developed economically or industrially. Both pursued state-
led industrial development, first by way of import-substitution industrialization, followed by a turn to 
emphasizing export-led industrialization in the late 1950s / early 1960s.  
Taking the view that industrial development does not appear as a ready formed institution, as an 
essence that always-already existed, what is of interest in this paper is the work of institutionalizing or 
institutionalization as an on-going process. Accordingly, and through the lens of actor-network theory 
(ANT), the paper follows how both countries structured/organized themselves to facilitate, encourage 
and achieve industrial development in practice between the late 1940s and late 1960s.  It is in following 
the various actors involved that we can come to explore how it is that institutionalization is produced, 
without having to assume from the outset that which we are looking to study (Copper and Law, 1995), 
and that we may more clearly see the “complexity of historical becoming” (Tourraine, 1988: 11). 
Of course, it must be said from the outset that this paper does not purport to be a definitive 
account of industrial development in either country. Rather, it is acknowledged that it is but a partial 
accounting of the process of institutionalization, for, as Gaddis (2001: 308, emphasis in original) noted, 
“there is no such thing as a definitive account of any historical episode.” 
Following Institutionalizating with Actor-Network Theory 
ANT is considered to have great potential for broadening and deepening our grasp of institutional 
work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). Given its focus on process, ANT offers a means to breathe life 
into the practices associated not just with institutionalization, but also de-institutionalization, rather than 
concentrate on institutions as reified structures (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). 
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In addressing institutionalization, ANT focuses on investigating how the institutional is 
“performed”, how materials of all sorts are “disciplined, constituted, organised, and/or organising 
themselves” (Law and Hetherington, 1999: 6). At the core of the approach lies 
a concern with how actors and organisations mobilise, juxtapose and hold together the bits and 
pieces out of which they are composed; how they are sometimes able to prevent those bits and 
pieces from following their own inclinations and making off; and how they manage, as a result, 
to conceal for a time the process of translation itself and so turn a network from a heterogeneous 
set of bits and pieces, each with its own inclinations, into something that passes as a 
punctualised actor. (Law, 1992: 386) 
Thus, through the “study of order building or path building” (Akrich and Latour, 1992: 259), I 
seek to illustrate the precariousness of institutionalization that is hidden by institutional theory; 
institutionalization does not exist outside its performance. I use Callon’s (1986a) four moments of 
translation (problematization, interessement, enrollment and mobilization) to illustrate institutionalization 
as a succession of translations, where the focus is on the actors enrolled and mobilized, on material 
heterogeneity, on actors performing relationally, and on contingency. 
For neo-institutionalists with an interest in understanding how institutions are created, sustained 
and disrupted, ANT offers insights and contributions in three key areas, namely, through moving from 
reification to relationality, from diffusion to translation and from power as property to power as product 
(Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). 
Institutionalization as Relational Effect 
ANT provides a good canvas on which to paint “the discriminations that are performed and the 
boundaries that are constructed in the activities it studies” (Lee and Hassard, 1999: 392). Through this 
approach, the analytical focus is relational and process-oriented, treating, for example, institutions as 
precarious, interactive effects, which are generated, heterogeneous, patterned, uncertain and contested in 
character (Law, 1992). 
At the heart of ANT is the metaphor of heterogeneous networks (Law, 1992) where, for example, 
institutionalization is the result of much hard work in which various bits and pieces, human and nonhuman, 
are juxtaposed into a network configuration that surmounts their individual resistances. Said another way, 
institutionalization is both a material matter and a question of arranging and ordering those materials. 
An actor is an effect generated in a heterogeneous network, such that, as implied by the term actor-
network, an actor is always a network (Law, 1992). Hence, “[a]n actor-network is simultaneously an actor 
whose activity is networking heterogeneous elements and a network that is able to redefine and transform 
what it is made of” (Callon, 1987: 93). Thus, beginning with a flat terrain, absent any dualisms, the actor-
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network approach serves to bypass the agency/structure distinction common to much social theory (Latour, 
1986; Strum and Latour, 1987), such that actors derive their intentionality and identity from the network, and 
not as independent agents. 
For ANT, all materials, human and nonhuman, have the characteristics they do as a consequence of 
their relations with other materials. ANT, therefore, is also understood in terms of relational materiality and 
performativity. In the case of the former, it employs a material semiotics whereby entities, human and 
nonhuman, assume their form and take on their characteristics as a consequence of their relations with other 
actors (Akrich and Latour, 1992; Law, 1999; Law and Hetherington, 1999). Akrich and Latour’s (1992: 259) 
redefinition of ANT as a semiotic theory of material assemblies reclaims a more general “nontextual and 
nonlinguistic interpretation” of semiotics as meaning “how one privileged trajectory is built, out of an 
indefinite number of possibilities”. Thus, defining semiotics as the “study of order building or path building” 
(Akrich and Latour, 1992: 259) broadens its meaning to encompass the orderings of material things. 
For Law and Hetherington (1999), a material semiotics has to do with materiality in the sense the 
institutional is created in circumstances that are materially heterogeneous, and it is a semiotics in that it 
assumes the institutional, along with what goes into producing the institutional, acquires its meaning and 
significance because of how everything interacts together, not because of its essential characteristics or 
qualities. Through seeking to understand how institutions are created, maintained and disrupted, therefore, a 
semiotics of materiality refuses the division between human and nonhuman, in addition to any prior 
judgment as to what counts as important or not, in favor of looking at the entire range of heterogeneous bits 
and pieces that go into the institutional (Law and Hetherington, 1999). 
It is here that the notion of performativity enters into play (Latour, 1986; Law, 1999; Law and 
Hetherington, 1999; Strum and Latour, 1987). In constituting the contingent, emergent phenomenon that we 
may come to call an institution (if at all), materials of all sorts “are being disciplined, constituted, organised, 
and/or organising themselves” (Law and Hetherington, 1999: 6). As a creation, an effect produced within 
heterogeneous relations, the material outcome that we (may come to) identify as an institution does not exist 
outside its performance. The institutional is an achievement as a result of performing the relations in which it 
is situated; it is how such performance is achieved that is of interest to ANT. It is precisely because the 
institutional is nothing more than relational effects that it is important to study how it is produced (Law, 1999; 
Law and Hetherington, 1999). 
Therefore, in moving from attending to the reified elements of institutions towards seeing institutions 
as relational effects (Law, 1992), an ANT approach draws attention to the ongoing and dynamic interactions 
that go into producing and contesting what we come to see as the outcomes of institutional work. For 
example, rather than tracking isomorphism through time and space, institutional researchers adopting an 
ANT perspective would focus on exploring the processes of interaction through which isomorphism emerges, 
is reproduced and contested. 
Seen thusly, ANT provides those engaged in institutional work with a means of addressing the issue of 
how to empirically investigate a phenomenon unavailable to conscious perception (Lawrence and Suddaby, 
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2006: 242). As things stand with traditional institutional work, it is only when institutions are being created 
or destroyed that the agency underlying institutional work becomes most visible and accessible, for it is here 
that the taken-for-grantedness is exposed. Outside of this, during periods when institutions have become 
reified and are apparently stable, neo-institutional research is faced with the problem of how to account for 
such stability. 
ANT provides a way out of this dilemma through focusing on how different networks are built around 
competing programs of action that generate outcomes, instead of being distracted by outcomes alone. As 
such, through problematizing the widely shared view of institutions as concrete and enduring social 
structures, in addition to reminding those engaged in institutional work that the very institutions they study 
“are fictions actively created and re-created by actors” (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006: 242), ANT is well 
placed to facilitate a broadening and deepening of our understanding of institutional work. 
Institutional Work as Translation 
From an ANT perspective, much organizational theorizing engages in the practice of purification, 
which requires categorization and classification, and it is through purifying that institutions can be 
identified. They can be classified and categorized according to an abstract set of features, such that they 
are rendered static, permanent, timeless, universal and, above all, knowable. In being purified, they 
become ideal-types against which to measure and verify that which pertains to them. But the question is, 
in order to purify, what has the knowledge-making enterprise left out? To focus on the practice of 
purification is only part of the story, for there is another practice, that of translation, on which much of 
our theorizing depends for its existence and yet which it denies at the same time (Latour, 1993). 
Concurrent with purifying the messy world in which we live, we also engage in translation. Here, 
far from separating everything into neat categories, their contacts are amplified, mixing together humans 
and nonhumans, without bracketing anything and without excluding any combination, in the process 
creating hybrids in the form of networks of humans and nonhumans. Different from the practice of 
purification, which involves separation, the practice of translation involves the threading together of any 
or all of these actors into a network that makes sense. It entails interconnecting these heterogeneous 
elements and viewing them as performing relationally, as interacting to produce what we contingently 
call an institution, with one actor seeking to redefine the meaning of the other actors, enrolling them 
into a position, such that its interests also become theirs. What results from the practice of translation 
are hybrids, networks that are both contingent and emergent. They are contingent in that their relations 
are never fixed for all time, such that the actor-networks could come asunder should the interests of any 
actors diverge. Similarly, they are emergent in that they do not appear ready formed, as pure essences 
that always-already existed. 
In focusing more on “the processes through which discretion emerges” and less on “the problem 
of giving accurate descriptions of discrete elements” (Lee and Hassard, 1999: 398-9, emphasis in 
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original), the empirical for ANT becomes the site of “active processing” where not only are the 
descriptions of the institutional being worked and reworked by actors, both human and nonhuman, but 
so too is the institutional itself. In addressing the institutional, therefore, ANT focuses its efforts on 
investigating how the institutional is “performed”. 
Moving away from diffusion, ANT’s concept of translation affords researchers looking to move 
past the totalizing view of institutions and institutional outcomes with both a conceptual and 
methodological means to advance their work. Thus, rather than trace diffusion across space and time, an 
ANT approach attends to the local motivations for adopting isomorphic templates, norms or practices, 
for example, and to local variations in the use and outcomes of adopting these isomorphic templates, 
norms or practices. What ANT avoids assuming is that all actors within an emerging network act in a 
similar way and for similar reasons. Indeed, different actors not only take on similar templates, norms or 
practices for different reasons, but, in the process of adoption, they also introduce slight changes to 
them (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). Therefore, a key difference between diffusion and translation is that 
diffusion is interested in the movement of, for example, a blackboxed institution through time and space; 
translation calls attention to the work of constructing the institutional and to the shifting associations 
and substitutions. 
Power as Product of Network Interactions 
Viewed through an ANT lens, power is conceptualized as a network effect: it “is not something 
you can hoard and possess, it is something that has to be made” (Latour, 1986: 274, emphasis in 
original), where the focus is on processes of enrollment and translation. As Murdoch notes (1995: 748), 
“those who are powerful are…those able to enrol, convince, and enlist others into networks on terms 
which allow the initial actors to ‘represent’ the others”. 
Thus, by way of a third contribution to the study of institutional creation, reproduction and demise, 
ANT facilitates those doing institutional work in moving away from conceiving of power as property 
towards seeing it as the product of network interactions (Callon and Latour, 1981): power is not the 
preserve of any individual actor with a network, rather it is distributed and it is the collective interaction 
of actors within a network that produces power. Seeing power thusly, that is, as a distributed process, 
moves the focus away from the locus or agents of change, for example, towards how actor-networks 
grow in size, complexity and power and draws on Callon’s (1986a, 1986b) process of translation. It 
moves the focus away from power used to mobilize resources within an institutional field towards 
attending to how institutions are created and contested, which, in turn, defines the resources and actors 
comprising the field. ANT affords a political perspective of power, where institutions appear as 
powerful and stable structures because of the actors holding together in a network and not because of 
their material or intrinsic nature. Power and agency are products of an actor-network that has become 
(temporarily) stabilized or blackboxed. 
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Doing Actor-Network Theory 
I engaged with Callon’s (1986a) four stages of translation as analytical lens to focus on particular 
moments in the process of institutionalization. The four “stages” are better understood as overlapping 
moments in an ongoing and contested process than as clearly demarcated steps toward a final endpoint. 
The first moment, problematization, the primary actor defines the problem and the set of relevant actors. 
By defining the problem and the program for dealing with it, the primary actor makes itself 
indispensable such that it becomes an obligatory passage point for these others attainment of the 
solution. To problematize in this way is to undertake an endeavor that may or may not be accomplished. 
The remainder of the translation process consists precisely of struggles to achieve consensus 
among all actors regarding this particular definition of problem and solution. Interessement, the second 
moment, the primary actor recruits other actors to assume roles in the network, roles that recognize the 
centrality of the primary actor’s own role. “Trials of strength” will determine whether the actors, as 
defined, will “submit to being integrated into the initial plan, or inversely, refuse the transaction by 
defining [their] identity, goals, projects, orientations, motivations or interests in another manner” 
(Callon, 1986a: 207). Through a variety of possible mechanisms, devices and strategies, ranging from 
simple solicitation to seduction to appeals to rationality to force, interessement projects are concerned 
with locking actors into the roles proposed for them, blocking out alternative identities, disrupting all 
possible competing associations, constructing a system of links or alliances among actors, and gaining 
their commitment. 
When successful, interessement validates problematization and the association(s) it implies. It 
also achieves enrollment, the third moment, in which roles are defined and actors formally accept and 
take on these roles. Finally, in the fourth moment, mobilization, the primary actor assumes a 
spokesperson role for passive network actors and seeks to mobilize them to action. This moment owes 
its name to the necessary movements and displacements that have occurred as previously unrelated 
actors have come into a chain of association, been rendered available and cooperative, and finally, 
become silent as the primary actor is now permitted to speak for them. 
The Irish Case 
We enter our story towards the end of the 1940s. Protectionist measures introduced since 1932 
were still in place and a policy of import-substitution industrialization was still being followed. Though 
Ireland remained neutral throughout World War 2, the raw materials, spare parts and energy shortages 
of the war years had crippled the industrial sector (Ó Gráda, 1997: 110). Though industrial output 
almost doubled and employment grew by half over the period 1945 and 1950, policy makers were 
becoming increasingly concerned about the evident inefficiency of Irish industry. 
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Thus, in 1947, the Minister for Industry and Commerce, Seán Lemass, proposed an unusually 
interventionist Industrial Efficiency Bill, as Fianna Fáil industrial policy had been quite laissez faire to 
this point in the sense of leaving it to private capital to take advantage of the space afforded by 
protectionism. Minister Lemass was proposing giving heretofore unprecedented powers to an Industrial 
Efficiency Bureau that could go as far as seizing an enterprise and running it as a state concern 
(O’Hearn, 1990: 14). However, the bill lapsed when Fianna Fáil lost the 1948 election.  
The Problematization and the Actors 
As the industrial development policy maker, the Minister for Industry and Commerce, Minister 
Morrissey, was positioned as the expert in figuring out what it was that industrial development wanted 
and needed to embed itself and prosper. But, he could not do the work on his own. He had to interest 
others in joining him, in the process building a network of allies. He had to identify the various actors 
involved – industrial development, government, Department of Industry and Commerce, Department of 
Finance, indigenous industry, possibly the opposition – and figure out what it was they wanted and what 
was potentially stopping them from achieving their goals. The minister had an interest in successfully 
embedding industrial development, which would see output and employment increase, and emigration 
decrease. As an elected politician, the minister had an interest in being re-elected and in remaining in 
portfolio/cabinet. 
As an actor, industrial development was having some success thanks to a policy of import-
substitution industrialization, supported by a protectionist regime. However, it has started to show signs 
of weakness thanks to market saturation and industrial inefficiency, allied with increasing 
unemployment and emigration. If industrial development was to survive and perpetuate itself, it needed 
to overcome these weaknesses. But how? What did industrial development need – by way of policies, 
laws, monies, protections, freedoms – to embed itself (i.e., become institutionalized)? 
The government was facing issues with rising migration from the land, industrial inefficiency, 
unemployment, and emigration, along with a saturated market and a deteriorating balance of payments 
situation. While import-substitution industrialization had been government policy since 1932, other than 
providing a wall of protective measures, the approach had been very much hands-off. The new 
government was a coalition and some of the partners would not accept abandoning protectionism. To 
win future elections, it was in the government’s interest to advance industrial development. 
The Department of Finance provided advice to its minister as part of the policy-making process. 
Once government approved policy presented by the minister, the department was then responsible for its 
execution. The Department controlled the budgeting process and had to be consulted on any staffing 
levels funded by government. The Department of Industry and Commerce provided advice to its 
minister on all matters to do with industry and commerce as part of the policy-making process. Once 
government approved policy presented by the minister, the department was then responsible for its 
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execution. The Department, which managed the protectionist regime, was a strong supporter of 
indigenous industry and its development under protectionism. 
Indigenous industry was interested in making profit and had done reasonably well under the 
existing import-substitution and protectionist policies. It was operating in a small, saturated market, 
which was getting smaller with ongoing emigration, and was prone to inefficiency. It was open to seeing 
what the policy makers proposed in terms of industrial development, so long as it was not detrimental to 
their situation and served their long-term interests. As things stood, indigenous industry supported 
maintaining the protectionist framework. It was represented by a number of associations, such as the 
Federation of Irish Manufacturers (FIM) and the National Agricultural and Industrial Development 
Association (NAIDA). 
The opposition was a potential ally. It had been in power for the previous 36 years, having won 
the previous five general elections outright. It instituted the policy of import-substitution 
industrialization and provided local industry the space to develop behind a protective wall. Recognizing 
that the status quo could not remain, it did not want to see its legacy undone. With an eye on future 
elections, it needed to come across as constructive in finding solutions to the problems facing the 
country, without giving solutions to the government. 
Tweaking Import-Substitution Industrialization 
As things stand, Minister Morrissey, the IPG government and industrial development are not 
satisfied with the status quo. Perhaps the introduction of a new actor can advise the minister in helping 
industrial development to improve. This new actor can learn what it is that industrial development needs 
to grow stronger. Thus, to advance industrial development, Minister Morrissey proposed a different 
approach that introduces a new actor, the Industrial Development Authority. This autonomous 
organization, with four appointed members and a support staff, was to be given an extensive brief that 
covered investigating the effects of existing and proposed protective measures, initiating proposals and 
schemes for the creation and development of Irish industry, advising on steps necessary for the 
expansion and modernization of existing industries, surveying possibilities of further industrial 
development, and advising the minister on matters of industrial development referred to it (Industrial 
Development Authority Act, 1950). 
Over the course of the interessement phase, the minister, along with the government, defined this 
new actor as a ‘specialized autonomous organization,’ a ‘self-governing, flexible type of organization,’ 
‘the ears and the brains of our whole industrial policy,’ ‘the most important initiative adopted by any 
government since the state was founded in terms of providing a permanent machinery to facilitate a 
long-term approach to the development of Irish industry,’ ‘a new conception involving a planned 
approach to industrial development by selected personnel with wide industrial experience operating as a 
self-governing body assisted by a skilled and experienced staff of state officials,’ an organization 
Institutionalizing Industrial Development:The Cases of Ireland and Taiwan 9 
 
engaged ‘in the carrying out of the task which so profoundly affects the national well-being,’ an 
organization of ‘prestige and influence’ entrusted with the ‘vital national task’ of industrial development 
and having the ‘fullest support’ of government, which pledged to decide on industrial policies ‘by 
reference to its recommendations.’ 
The addition of this new actor potentially addressed the needs of the minister, the new 
government and industrial development to remain with the alliance. However, the other actors had to be 
convinced. The Department of Finance initially proved unwilling to back the proposal, preferring 
instead the hands-off approach of leaving private enterprise to seek out opportunity. If the proposal were 
to go ahead, Finance was of the view that it would need to be an advisory board, and not a “gang of 
crackpot socialist planners”, and that it would need to gain the confidence of the business community 
(Lee, 1989: 310). Finance’s influence would be assured through controlling the staffing of all but the 
most senior positions. The Department of Industry and Commerce was opposed to establishing the IDA 
(Girvin, 1989: 176-81; Lee, 1989: 309-12), but it followed the wishes of the minister. 
The minister and government leaders addressed leading industrialists through speeches at 
meetings of the likes of the Federation of Irish Manufacturers. In seeking to translate the interests of 
indigenous industry, government statements and speeches were all aimed at reinforcing the rationale for, 
and benefits of, setting up the IDA, while also assuaging any concerns that protection would be removed. 
The opposition refused to support establishing the IDA, instead arguing that the IDA would be a 
toothless commission and an impediment to the drive for industrial development it had initiated, while 
noting its work was already being done effectively by the Department of Industry and Commerce. The 
opposition also sought to win over the IDA members by threating to abolish the organization when in 
government, thus leaving them without a job. The minister amended the establishing legislation to 
nullify the effects of this threat. 
Passage of the Industrial Development Authority Act in 1950 effectively attached the IDA to the 
Irish legal system. At this point, interessement is successful, the interests of the actors have been aligned, 
and they are enrolled; an actor-network has been built. However, in due course, the minister, the 
government and the Department of Finance betrayed the alliance by denying the IDA the level of 
resources needed to fulfill its remit. Further, because of the burden of administering protectionism, the 
IDA never got to do anything related to developing new or existing industry, thus losing industrial 
development as an ally. The actor-network did not hold together, so the translation failed. 
As if to make matters worse, the threat to abolish the IDA became real when the opposition 
returned to government in 1951. However, subscribing to advancing industrial development, and 
following discussions with the IDA’s chairman to arrange how it should operate, Minister Lemass 
decided to confine the organization’s work to the promotion of new industry (PDDE, v.126, col.1515, 
12-July-1951), while the Department of Industry and Commerce would once again have responsibility 
for administrative work dealing with quotas, tariffs, and export and import licenses, along with 
examining industrial proposals from private investors and developing existing industries. With the 
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domestic market at saturation, and in line with advancing industrial development, Minister Lemass 
enrolls An Córas Tráchtála Teoranta (CTT, the Irish Trade Company) in 1951 to promote, assist and 
develop indigenous industry exports to North America. Minister Lemass also enrolls an administrative 
body, An Foras Tionscal (the Industry Board), to incentivize private enterprise to locate in 
disadvantaged areas. 
Though a number of actors were redefined and created, Minister Lemass returned to a relatively 
hands-off approach to advance industrial development, hands-off in the sense that the state would not 
initiate anything, but that private enterprise would take advantage of the measures and protection made 
available by the state. While the new industrial development actor-network achieved some success, it 
was wholly insufficient to match the level of unemployment and emigration, which continued unabated. 
A New Direction for Industrial Development 
By 1956, the country was showing the effects of four years of deflationary policies and chronic 
under-investment in the economy, which saw industrial output fall by three per cent and employment 
fall by two per cent, while the previous decade had seen emigration in the order 300,000 (Murphy, 2009: 
106, 134). By this point, the Department of Finance had defected from the alliance through policies that 
were harming industrial development, while indigenous industry seemed either unable or unwilling to 
support industrial development. Thus, while private enterprise remained the central force behind 
industrial development policy, and with indigenous industry seeming to defect, then perhaps a new actor, 
foreign investment, needs to be courted. 
Experience on the ground moved the IDA towards foreign investment as a means to driving 
industrial development. Narrowing the IDA’s focus marked a critical move for its future development, 
albeit the sense of uncertainty surrounding its future also weakened it for a time (Girvin, 1989: 180). 
With little to offer in promoting new industry, the IDA attracted new investment from whatever source 
was available, whether foreign or indigenous, in the process learning what investors required. Now 
seeing export-led industrialization as the only way to create employment and foreign direct investment 
as a source for such industrialization, the IDA became the primary actor, and obligatory passage point, 
convincing the minister and government of the need to change course and aggressively pursuing a new 
actor, foreign industry, in support. 
Another change of government and Minister Norton (heading the Department of Industry and 
Commerce) saw policy move to incorporate foreign direct investment as a means to advance industrial 
development. The minister noted that the country’s “chronic economic problems” had defied solution 
over the course of 34 years of independence (PDDE, Vol.155, Cols.54-63, 7-March-1956) and that, 
despite continued appeals and offers of every possible assistance to Irish industrialists to establish new 
industries geared towards import-substitution and export, he considered it his and the government’s 
obligation to look to foreign capital and technical know-how to drive industrial development (PDDE, 
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Vol.155, Cols.54-63, 7-March-1956). With both Minister Norton and government now advocating FDI, 
and aware that investors would “have to be wooed aggressively” (PDDE, v.152, col.1096-1097, 14-July-
1955), the IDA began to actively promote the “very special advantages [Ireland had] to offer the 
external investor” in terms of location for ease of access to European and UK markets, trade agreements 
with most European countries, duty exemptions for Irish goods exported to the UK and preferential 
tariff treatment for Irish goods exported to British Commonwealth countries (PDDE, v.149, col.525-526, 
23-March-1955). Because protectionism was not being abandoned, indigenous industry did not object; 
indeed, some viewed the arrival of FDI as good for indigenous industry in bringing more dynamism and 
potentially helping it expand and develop (Murphy, 2009: 109). 
Now enrolled by the IDA, government introduced export profit tax relief (EPTR) in the Finance 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956, which started at a 50 per cent reduction in taxes on export profits 
for a period of five consecutive years, to persuade foreign industrialists to use Ireland as an export base. 
The Finance Act, 1958, increased the EPTR to 100 per cent and extended the relief from five to ten 
years up to the year 1970. At a time when the IDA had few other advantages to attract foreign 
investment, EPTR sent two strong messages to international business: first, that Ireland was pro-
enterprise through rewarding profit; and, second, that the country favored a long-term approach to 
investment (MacSharry and White, 2000: 246-7). This proved of increasing interest to the sort of export-
oriented FDI sought. 
With Fianna Fáil winning the 1957 election, Minister Lemass continued the previous 
government’s policy of welcoming FDI, with the 1958 Finance Act increasing EPTR from 50 to 100 per 
cent and extending its duration from five to ten years. Further, enactment of the 1958 Industrial 
Development (Encouragement of External Investment) eased the restrictions on foreign ownership of 
industry, further signaling the intent to welcome foreign participation in support of driving export-
oriented industrial development. 
T.K. Whitaker, Secretary of the Department of Finance – whose impatience with the status quo 
could be seen in his view that the Department “should do some independent thinking and not simply 
wait for Industry and Commerce or the IDA to produce ideas” (Fanning, 1978: 509) – became the 
primary actor, and obligatory passage point, in advancing industrial development following the 1958 
publication of Economic Development (Department of Finance, 1958a). Marking a definitive policy shift 
to abandon protectionism in favor of liberalization, and equating a viable economy with political 
independence (Murphy, 2009: 124), Whitaker noted:  
The policies, hitherto followed, though given a fair trial, have not resulted in a viable 
economy. … [L]arge-scale emigration and unemployment still persist. The population is falling, 
the national income rising more slowly than the rest of Europe. A great and sustained effort to 
increase production, employment and living standards is necessary to avert economic 
decadence. … It seems clear that, sooner or later, protection will have to go and the challenge of 
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free trade accepted. There is really no other choice for a country wishing to keep pace materially 
with the rest of Europe. (Department of Finance, 1958b: 2) 
Concurrently, the dynamic in Western Europe and North America, the areas with which Ireland had 
closest trading relations, was very much moving towards freer trade, the most powerful example being 
the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957. 
Building on Economic Development, the (First) Programme for Economic Expansion (Department 
of Finance, 1958b) accepted that the only way forward was through further industrial expansion based 
largely on production for export markets. It concluded that achieving success would require that the 
state provide adequate facilities to encourage industrial development, that policies hampering industrial 
development be overhauled, modified or abandoned, and that foreign investment in industry, either 
financial or technical, be welcomed (Department of Finance, 1958b: 35-6). 
Whitaker’s policy path to industrial development won around all actors, including: Minister 
Lemass and the new Fianna Fáil government, which saw that the policy in which they had long invested 
had failed to fully induce industrial development sufficient to achieve full employment; the Department 
of Finance, which had become more active and interventionist; indigenous industry, which would be 
supported to adapt to the changing circumstances; and the opposition, which had already been moving in 
this policy direction. However, the new policy is said to have been met with “intransigent hostility” by 
the Department of Industry and Commerce (Murphy, 2009: 148). Long a supporter of indigenous 
industry under protectionism, the Department felt a sense of loyalty and obligation, along with a sense 
of unease that up to 60 per cent of, or around 100,000, industrial jobs could be lost in the protected 
sector under liberalization (Murphy, 2009: 134). It was not until Lemass became Taoiseach (Prime 
Minister) in 1959, and with Jack Lynch as the new minister, that the Department was moved away from 
its ingrained position on protectionism (Murphy, 2009: 148). 
Facing the challenges of, and prospering in, a more acutely competitive world required continued 
adaptation of existing industry, along with continued expansion of the industrial base through promotion 
to establish new Irish businesses and attract foreign investment.  To accomplish this, and in line with 
policy outlined in the First Programme (Department of Finance, 1958b: 39), the Industrial Grants Act, 
1959, brought about a reorganization of the country’s industrial development machinery, transferring 
the grant-making powers of the IDA to An Foras Tionscal. As to the rationale for financial incentives, 
[i]f people are thinking of establishing new concerns for export…[o]ur facilities must equate to 
those which they can get elsewhere. That is the justification, and indeed the only justification 
apart from our urgent need to get expansion of our industrial activities, for free grants at all. 
While in 1952 we could contemplate industrial expansion proceeding without the attraction of 
free grants being generally available…that situation does not now exist. We have to take 
account of what is happening elsewhere and build up here the same inducements to industrial 
expansion as people are being given elsewhere.  (PDDE, Vol.176, Cols.736-737, 7-July-1959) 
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Thus, successive pieces of legislation over the course of the following decade – the Undeveloped 
Areas (Amendment) Act, 1963, and the Industrial Grants (Amendment) Acts of 1961, 1963 1964, 1966, 
1968, 1968 (No. 2) and 1969 – removed the limit on the lifespan of An Foras Tionscal, enlarged the 
agency’s funding powers, gave it additional flexibility in assessing grant applications, gave it the task of 
establishing and managing industrial estates, introduced a grant payback clause should grantees 
contravene certain asset and share capital disposal terms, introduced and extended the grant period for 
enlargements or adaptations, extended the panoply of grants once restricted to undeveloped areas to all 
areas of the country, and progressively increased the maximum aggregate of grants, which went from 
£6m in 1959 to £100m by 1969. 
The reorganization also freed the IDA to focus exclusively on attracting FDI, effectively turning it 
into an investment promotion agency, with a clear indication to increase the organization’s scope and 
resources should its efforts prove successful: 
The Industrial Development Authority will continue the present drive to attract foreign 
industrial development to Ireland. Considerable success has already been achieved and it is 
reasonable to hope that the successful establishment and operation here of important industries 
financed mainly by foreign capital will serve as an attraction to other similar ventures. The 
Government attach the greatest importance to the promotional activities of the Industrial 
Development Authority and will be ready to widen the scope of the organisation and increase 
the resources at its disposal, if experience suggests the need for it. (Department of Finance, 
1958b: 40) 
Buoyed by the positive results, over the course of the next decade, government continued to invest 
in the policy of export-led industrialization through, for example: extending the terminal date for EPTR 
at the full rate to 1974-75 with the 1960 Finance Act; repealing in 1964 of the Control of Manufactures 
Acts, 1932 to 1934, which sounded the formal death knell of protectionism; signing the Anglo-Irish Free 
Trade Agreement, 1965, which provided duty-free access to the UK market of 55m people a year later; 
and once again extending the terminal date of EPTR to 1979-80 with the 1967 Income Tax Act. 
In terms of the returns from the First Programme, the volume of total industrial production rose 
by approximately 42 per cent between 1958 and 1963, or around 7.2 per cent per year; exports where 
were considered a major stimulus to expanding industrial production, rose from £32.8m in 1958 to 
£62.2m in 1963; employment in industry rose from 243,000 in 1958 to 274,000 in 1963, or 2.4 per cent 
per year; and productivity rose by an average of 4.7 per cent per year between 1958 and 1963 
(Department of Finance, 1964: 142). The IDA’s promotional efforts saw 133 foreign companies invest 
in operations in Ireland, the capital investment amounting to £38.5m and the employment potential 
amounting to 20,000 jobs (Department of Finance, 1964: 154).  However, it should be noted that most 
of these projects received grants from An Foras Tionscal such that IDA secured investment accounted 
for some 93 per cent of the £41.3m in capital investment and for 20,000 of the 24,000 potential jobs. 
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Over the course of the Second Programme (1964 to 1967), grants to the 114 foreign companies 
attracted by the IDA amounted to £14.2m, with aggregate capital investment of £43.8m and potential 
employment of 14,000.  It is worth noting that the contribution of IDA-attracted companies in terms of 
industrial employment accounted for 82 per cent of the 17,000 job increase between 1964 and 1967 
(Department of Finance, 1968). 
The Third Programme for Economic and Social Development (1969 to 1972) noted that in the 
decade from 1958 to 1968 GNP had grown “three times as fast as during the preceding decade and 
nearly four times as fast as in the years leading up to the Second World War,” albeit this was a pattern 
that was evident in Western European countries (Department of Finance, 1969: 5).   
All was not good news, however. Though employment growth in indigenous industry resumed in 
the first half of the 1960s, growth stalled with the lowering and removal of the protectionist wall in the 
second half of the 1960s and 1970s (Murray, 2008: 3). In essence, the policy of protection had 
contributed to the weak state of indigenous industry, which necessitated efforts at bringing about 
adaptation to the reality of freer trade. Established in 1961 to appraise the measures “that may require to 
be taken to adapt Irish industry to conditions of more intensive competition in home and export 
markets” (PDDE, Vol. 191, 5-July-1961, Col. 207), the Committee on Industrial Organisation “found 
that in many industrial concerns buildings were unsuitable, procedures and equipment obsolete, 
direction and management unenterprising, operative training inadequate and the range of variety in 
production too wide.  In these firms the urgent need of reorganisation is receiving insufficient attention, 
and, even since publication of the Committee’s reports, there has been no convincing indication that 
sufficient thought is being given to preparing for the more acute competition that lies ahead” (1963: 35). 
Much of indigenous industry, given its persistent weakness and less than adequate progress in 
modernizing, even with modernization grants available from An Foras Tionscal, proved ill suited to the 
vagaries of free trade (CIP, 1973; CIO, 1965; Flynn, 1972; NIEC, 1968). 
As an indication of the country’s dependence on FDI to create jobs, in the period January 1960 to 
March 1973, foreign investment accounted for 76 per cent of total projected employment coming from 
new industries and major expansions (see Table 1). 
Origin Total Projected 
Employment 
Number of Projects Total Capital Investment 
Indigenous 15,433 (24%) 228 (31%) £57.1m (20%) 
Foreign 49,185 (76%) 503 (69%) £121.6m (80%) 
Total 64,618 731 £178.7m 
Table 1: Source: IDA Annual Report, 1972/73: 12. 
As further evidence of the increasing dependence on FDI, we see the numbers employed in IDA grant-
aided industries absorbing an increasing proportion of the total numbers employed in industry (see 
Table 2). 
 
Institutionalizing Industrial Development:The Cases of Ireland and Taiwan 15 
 
 1963 1967 1971 
Employed in IDA grant-
aided industries 
5,000 16,000 38,000 
Total employed in 
manufacturing 
189,000 201,000 224,000 
IDA / Total 2.6% 8% 17% 
Table 2: Source: IDA Annual Report, 1971: 14. 
By the mid-1960s, the IDA moved to re-position itself as the primary actor, and obligatory passage 
point, in advancing all industrial development. It engaged consultants Arthur D. Little (1967a, 1967b), who 
argued that industrialization was the only means to create the estimated 316,000 to 353,000 jobs needed to 
achieve full employment over the period 1966 to 1981. Further arguing that this was well beyond the 
capacity of indigenous industry, the task of persuading enough new industry to locate in Ireland to create the 
level of employment needed required substantially increasing the IDA’s resources, in addition to granting it 
the capacity and flexibility to control its own operations. Reviews by the National Industrial Economic 
Council (1968) and the Public Services Organisation Review Group (1969) echoed and reinforced the 
reorganization recommended in Little (1967a), calling for the existing range of agencies dealing with 
industrial development to be streamlined and expertise to be concentrated within the IDA. 
Thus, with the Industrial Development Act of 1969, responsibility for industrial development was 
concentrated in a more autonomous and powerful IDA, which became “the key coordinator of industrial 
policy and the most significant planning agency in the Irish Republic … [T]he ‘civil service climate’ was 
swept away and the new managing director populated the IDA with new talent on contractual terms akin to 
‘venture management’ – they were public servants with flair” (Jacobsen, 1994: 104-5). 
The IDA became the primary actor, and obligatory passage point, in advancing industrial development. 
As of the end of our story, industrial development has been institutionalized in the IDA actor-network and 
the IDA now speaks in the name of all, albeit building the allegiance of indigenous industry proves a 
persistent problem. 
The Taiwan Case 
We enter our story in the case of Taiwan at the end of the 1940s. Both the bombing and general 
neglect of Taiwan during WW2 left much of the country’s economy in ruin. The end of colonial rule left an 
initial skill gap when the managers, administrators and technicians running the Japanese state monopolies 
and Japanese-owned factories departed Taiwan, albeit the monopolies and factories were all taken over by 
the KMT administration. The KMT, preoccupied with the struggle against the communists, focused little 
attention on Taiwan in the initial postwar years. Economic mismanagement contributed to corruption, 
hyperinflation and unemployment, while at the same time the island was burdened with supplying 
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commodities to meet shortages on the mainland. Between 1946 and 1950, some one million mainland 
refugees (mainly civil servants and military) arrived on Taiwan, which in 1946 had a population of about six 
million. This abrupt population increase worsened already existing problems as concerns food, necessities 
and employment. The 2-28 uprising of 1947, which was violently suppressed by the KMT and followed by 
martial law, added to the growing feelings of mistrust between the local Taiwanese population and the KMT 
state. Thus, by the close of the 1940s and early 1950s, the KMT state was having to cope with an economy in 
ruins, a frustrated and angry local population, and an unpredictable political future (Myers, 1973: 42-3). 
With no strong ties to Taiwan, the KMT state was highly autonomous. Accordingly, it had fairly wide-
ranging latitude to endorse and implement policies without much reference to the population at large. That 
said, defeat on the mainland, precipitated by economic mismanagement, presented the KMT with 
opportunity for reflection and for a different response to Taiwan’s economic situation. Thus, the KMT state 
could not entirely afford to ignore the population at large, as the 228 uprising had already demonstrated. 
Therefore, while security and defense were of great concern, along with the ambition to take back the 
mainland, so too was bringing about economic stability on Taiwan. As Chiang Kai-shek stated in 1951: 
“What we should be concerned with is not that we are unable to take the mainland back but that we are 
incapable of building Taiwan up” (Liu, 1987: 87). 
The Problematization and the Actors 
With this as context, we can turn to the actors of our story. In terms of government, the top political 
leadership (namely Chiang Kai-shek and Ch’en Ch’eng) spoke for the state. Presented as an “impregnable 
leader” (Pang, 1992: 84), Chiang’s position in 1949 as head of state, party and army afforded him extensive 
powers to assign, sack or reassign officials, both civilian and military, for example, to prevent any individual 
or group from becoming too dominant (Clough, 1978: 47-8). 
The top leadership essentially decided all key national policies in advance of their formulation and 
execution. Thus, operationally, though there was a policy-making structure – comprising the Central 
Standing Committee, the Commission on Policy Coordination, the Executive Yuan Council and the 
Legislative Yuan – that decided on policy, in effect, it was the top leadership whose decision counted with 
the relevant bodies approving passage without much resistance (Pang, 1992: 77).  
When it came to economic affairs, Chiang gave Ch’en Ch’eng the mandate to manage the economy, a 
position that granted Ch’en considerable power in deciding economic matters (Pang, 1992: 87). Over the 
course of our story, Ch’en held the positions of Taiwan Production Board (TPB) Chairman (1949), Council 
for United States Aid (CUSA) Chairman (1950-54 and 1958-63), Prime Minister (1950-54 and 1958-63), 
Vice President (1954-65), and Deputy KMT Party Leader (1954-65). However, the top leadership relied on 
the recommendations of the economic policy makers and seldom interfered in economic policy making 
(Pang, 1992: 82), with Ch’en noting, “I am not a learned man myself, but I can accept and execute opinions 
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from learned people” (Clough, 1978: 48). As such, the policy makers did not need to convince the entire 
policy-making structure as a whole; rather, it was the top leadership that was their target. 
Though the top political leadership decided Taiwan’s priorities, in practice, it was the economic policy 
makers who acted as the primary actor, and obligatory passage point, in shaping and institutionalizing 
Taiwan’s industrial development. The policy makers of the 1950s and 1960s were more exposed to Western 
influence in terms of where they were born and their university education (Liu, 1987: 89-92). Most had 
middle class backgrounds, with none having owned a business on Taiwan. Further, most had their training in 
engineering or science (Hofheinz and Calder, 1982: 57), such that they pursued a fairly practical and flexible 
learning-by-doing approach to economic development as opposed to the thinking of any specific school of 
economics (Pang, 1992: 94). For example, in relation to liberalization and protection, K.Y. Yin held “no 
preoccupation about these out-of-date theories. If liberalization has more advantages, we should prefer 
liberalization; if protection can yield more advantages, we must chose protection. Policies are made for 
solving problems, therefore should be adapted to time, place, and issue. Economic policy making must not 
be inflexible” (Yin, 1973: 3). 
Yin, who “dominated and forged the broad lines of Taiwan’s economy in the 1950s and early 1960s” 
(Pang, 1992: 98), is considered “the pilot of Taiwan’s economic development” (Pang, 1992: 94) through 
setting the groundwork for the country’s industrialization. He was influenced by a number of ideas, including 
the Japanese model and experience of economic development, which influenced his own thinking in relation 
to Taiwan (Pang, 1992: 97-8). For him, where a developing country 
lacks entrepreneurs, the state must create conditions conducive to private investment such as the 
construction of infrastructure and the provision of fiscal incentives; the state must lay down the 
general direction of development by overall planning; the state must take initiatives to establish 
those enterprises which local capitalists are not yet able or willing to invest in; and the state must 
also take the lead in opening up foreign trade, renovating old facilities of production, and educating 
and diffusing technical and professional knowledge. (Pang, 1992: 97) 
He would be typical of many economic policy makers, having an engineering background, amassing 
experience in a number of different positions, and then serving in a variety of roles at ministerial and supra-
ministerial level, including at the same time. He served as an Assistant Manger in China Development 
Finance Corporation (1936-40), Director of the Chinese Foreign Trade Office, New York (1941-46), 
Executive Director of Hwainan Mining and Railway Company (1947-49), Deputy Chairman of the TPB 
(1949-54), President of the Central Trust of China (1950-55), Convener of the Industrial Development 
Commission (IDC) (1953-55), Minister of Economic Affairs (1954-55), member and Secretary General of 
the Economic Stabilization Board (ESB) (1957-58), Vice Chairman of CUSA (1958-63), Chairman of the 
FETCC (1958-63) and Chairman of the Board of the Bank of Taiwan (1960-63). Thus, Yin was in a position 
to enroll and mobilize a number of agencies, and ideas, in the service of Taiwan’s industrial development 
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In terms of indigenous industry, though the Japanese occupation had contributed towards Taiwan’s 
industrial development, the Japanese had not encouraged the development of Taiwanese capitalists or 
industrial personnel, such that they were few in number and weak in the immediate post-war years. While 
many entrepreneurs having experience running textile and food processing businesses followed the KMT to 
Taiwan (Pang, 1992: 112), those with capital proved reluctant to invest given the uncertain political and 
economic situation (Pang, 1992: 147). Thus, policy makers focused on supporting state enterprises and select 
industries in driving industrial development, to the exclusion of much of the small-scale, private sector. 
Relations between local industrialists and government officials were described as “distant”, with the 
two living together but acting separately (Wade, 1990: 276). This is not to say that there were no interactions 
between the two.  Indeed, in his capacity as IDC Convenor, Yin brought in a number of local capitalists as 
IDC advisors. However, these capitalists were only there to provide information to the policy makers and 
then follow the policy that emerged. Local capitalists were also encouraged to set up associations to 
communicate with the policy makers, such as the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce, 
which was established in 1951. The associations served a top-down function to communicate state policy to 
their members (Gold, 1986: 71). Thus, while there were interactions between local capitalists and policy 
makers, the communication was essentially one way to serve the needs of the policy makers. 
Given limited government finances, funding the country’s industrial development required finding 
additional sources of revenue. Policy makers saw in the development of agriculture the possibility to extract 
surplus value, which could be diverted to other uses, including subsidizing industrial development (Ho, 1978: 
105; Hsiao, 1981: 56). This required a process of interessement to make allies of actors from the agricultural 
sector, namely farmers and landowners. Policy makers recommended land reform to give farmers long-term 
economic stability, which was endorsed by the top leadership as it pleased the majority in rural areas and 
secured their loyalty. No longer mere tenants paying exorbitant land rents and focused on the short term, 
farmers were free, with state assistance, to drive productivity and profit more from their own labor. 
Meanwhile, landowners were neutralized in that they saw no other option but to accept. They had no 
leverage with policy makers or government, the US government approved of the land reform, the land 
reform was highly popular with the rural community, and the 228 experience served as warning that any 
attempt at an uprising would be extinguished with the full force of the state. 
Influencing Priorities and Resources 
The tussle over priorities and resources in the early years of industrial development, between 
those favoring a return to the mainland and those favoring developing Taiwan, introduces two further 
actors: the ROC military and the US government. While Chiang is credited with playing a decisive role 
in deciding priorities and resource allocation (Pang, 1992: 85), it was the military and the pro-
development policy makers who were actively courting the top leadership through the process of 
interessement. 
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On the one hand, those favoring prioritizing a return to the mainland did not support the 
development of Taiwan detracting from this aim. For them, there was a persistent need to dedicate 
limited resources to maintaining military strength to defend the island against attack and take back the 
mainland when the timing was right. On the other hand, those favoring the development of Taiwan held 
the view that military aims could best be achieved through developing Taiwan as a viable, independent 
economy, both to build capacity to recover the mainland and as an example of the failure of 
Communism.  The top leadership initially favored those advocating for recovering the mainland, such 
that a greater level of resources was directed towards military and security purposes (Clough, 1978: 45). 
Indeed, this position suited the US government, another actor of interest to the policy makers, a 
contributor of significant military aid.  
Having lost the mainland to the communists, by the end of 1949, the US government adopted a 
hands-off policy towards the ROC, with the government losing all US military aid and support. 
However, by June 1950, the Korean War, and the confrontation between US and Chinese communist 
forces that also resulted, saw the resumption of aid to the ROC on a large scale, initially to offset the 
significant military burden on the national budget (accounting for about 80 per cent [Lin, 1992: 52]), 
and to bring about economic and social stability (Jacoby, 1966: 30-1). In aiding the ROC, the goals of 
the US government were to support the military to defend against the spread of communism to the 
island, to discourage the ROC from going to war on the mainland, and to raise the level of prosperity for 
the general population to ward off a turn to communism in desperation. 
While the US government did not explicitly emphasize economic development in the early years, 
by the mid-1950s, it shifted towards prioritizing the resourcing of economic development to bring about 
a self-supporting economy (Jacoby, 1966: 33) and lent its support to the pro-development policy makers 
in enrolling the top leadership. With the economy stabilized, pre-war living standards reached, and 
restrained by the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty stipulating that the “use of force will be a matter of joint 
agreement” (Chiu, 1973: 250-3), the top leadership was seeming more agreeable to shift the balance of 
resources towards economic development. The pro-development policy makers’ persistence in arguing 
that economic development would not only bring greater prosperity for the population and increase the 
government’s legitimacy with the population, but that the improvement in the people’s livelihood made 
for compelling propaganda against the communists had gained in appeal. Indeed, economic development 
was being seen as strengthening the possibility of a return to the mainland (Jacoby, 1966: 36-7). 
Through its advisors on the ground in Taiwan, the US government increasingly supported the pro-
development policy makers, lending influence through written analyses, oral presentations, retaining 
independent experts to conduct technical and economic studies of ROC-government projects seeking 
assistance, and sitting in on meetings of the CUSA, ESB, and FETCC. With control over the 
disbursement of aid, the US advisors were in a strong position to influence policy, with aid tied to 
reforms by way of incentive. This suited the pro-development policy makers, who could mobilize the 
US advisors as “whipping boys” and argue for economic reforms favored by the US (Jacoby, 1966: 135-
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7). With Taiwan a US ally in containing the communist threat, however, the US advisors had to be wary 
of the leverage they exerted, such that it suited them to support the policy makers in accomplishing 
much of the reform through self-selection (Gold, 1986: 58-9). 
Stabilizing with Import-Substitution Industrialization 
With the encouragement of the policy makers, and behind a wall of protection, local capitalists 
emerged in the 1950s on foot of an interventionist policy to develop import-substitution industries (Lin, 
1973: 40-1; Ranis, 1979: 211-2). Industry on the island in the early 1950s comprised a large-scale, 
comparatively modern public sector – largely inherited from the Japanese, but with some state 
enterprises moved from the mainland (Kuo, Ranis and Fei, 1981: 61) – and a small-scale, comparatively 
traditional private sector. Thus it was that the state controlled all large industrial concerns, along with 
the banks. While these state controlled enterprises were revived and developed with low-cost loans 
extended by state banks and US aid, the private sector did not receive the same treatment (Lee and 
Hsiao, 2014: 239). 
Yin leveraged his various positions as Vice Chairman of the TPB, President of the Central Trust 
of China (the largest trading agency) and Convener of the IDC to “forge the broad lines of fostering 
private enterprise” (Pang, 1992: 148). With the establishment of the TPB in 1949, policy makers 
prioritized development of electricity to power industry, chemical fertilizers to bolster rice production, 
and textiles as the country’s main import. The state looked after electricity and chemical fertilizers, 
while textiles were left to the private sector. 
Yin formed a joint textile group made up of officials from relevant state agencies, which adopted 
the policy slogan “importing yarn is better than importing cloth; importing cotton is better than 
importing yarn” (Chiu, 2009: 514). The group developed an entrustment scheme, where the state 
supplied the raw materials (US aid-financed cotton imports), purchased the output, and excluded foreign 
competition through import restrictions (Lin, 1973: 60-3). This meant that the so-called entrepreneur 
had little to no risk and stood to profit quite handsomely. As a result, domestic textile production 
expanded quickly, with competition driving down prices, and with companies expending into man-made 
fibers by the end of the decade (Chiu, 2009). Though the entrustment scheme was open to anyone, many 
of the companies were established by mainlanders, due to their experience in the business on the 
mainland and their connections with the bureaucracy (Pang, 1992: 149), something US advisors 
criticized (Gold, 1986: 70-1). Some Taiwanese entrepreneurs got their start by the mid-1950s with the 
help of state and US aid to foster import-substituting industries (Gold, 1986: 71). 
In actively developing import-substituting industries, the policy makers took charge of putting 
enterprises together – identifying and analyzing opportunities, developing investment plans, and putting 
together support packages that included low-interest loans, foreign exchange, and technical support – 
and then searched for local entrepreneurs to step in and assume ownership. They also developed a 
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complementary foreign trade and exchange policy – comprising tariffs, quotas, import controls, and 
multiple exchange rates – to protect indigenous industry from foreign competition and prioritize foreign 
exchange for needed capital and raw material imports. 
With an extensive support package and import controls in place, together with virtually no foreign 
industry setting up on the island in this period, import-substitution industries developed quickly as a 
result of the measures designed to both encourage and protect (Lin, 1973: 66), along with creating a 
group of industrial capitalists. By 1954, domestic production was supplying 77 per cent of domestic 
consumption and, by the end of the 1950s, consumer goods imports amounted to 7 per cent of domestic 
supply. Industrial production more than doubled by the end of the 1950s and, as a proportion of all 
industrial production, the private sector went from 27.5 per cent (1949) to 50 per cent (1958) (Pang, 
1992: 161). Industry’s contribution to gross domestic product increased from 18 per cent (1952) to 24 
per cent (1958), while industry’s share of the labor force went from 17 per cent (1952) to 20 per cent 
(1958).  
However, by the mid-1950s, import-substitution industrialization encountered some serious 
difficulties. With the domestic market reaching saturation, growth in import-substitution industries 
slowing and excess production capacity increasing, indigenous industry appealed for change. While the 
Provincial Association of Industries sought permission to create sectoral industrial cartels to control 
price cutting through restricting sales competition, other indigenous industrialists pointed to the 
negative effect foreign trade and exchange policy was having in dampening industrial exports and called 
for measures to redress the discrimination. 
Moving to Export-Led Industrialization 
While all economic policy makers in the first half of the 1950s favored state dominance and 
intervention in the economy, by the second half a split had emerged between a conservative-
interventionist leaning group that favored continuing with the status quo and a more liberal-reformist 
group that advocated opening up the economy, with the latter prevailing (Pang, 1992: 101, 175). Though 
it was the political leadership that decided the outcome, it was the policy makers who took the initiative 
in influencing the leadership to their policy view. Those that won out were successful in their 
probelamtization of protectionism as negatively impacting industrial development through reducing 
efficiency and hampering exports, while at the same time advancing the view that the needed reforms 
would enable Taiwan move from being dependent on aid to a position of self-reliance. 
Though Yin was a key proponent of import-substitution industrialization under protection, as of 
1954, he also recognized its downsides, namely profiteering, inefficiency, and attempts at cartelization 
(Yin, 1973: 27-8). As he saw it, the only solution was to promote efficient, quality production and 
expand exports, with the state adopting necessary measures to facilitate indigenous industry to enter 
foreign markets (Yin, 1973: 32-5). 
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The prospect that Taiwan could be an exporter of anything other than traditional, largely 
agricultural products seemed beyond imagination in the early 1950s (Pang, 1992: 167-8). Nevertheless, 
along with Yin, K.T. Li (IDC member [1953-58)] saw the potential for industrial exports and began 
arguing the case in support. However, policy makers only managed to introduce a system to rebate 
duties payable on raw materials destined for export use in 1954, followed by using a portion of foreign 
exchange earnings for importing raw materials destined for export use in 1956. Exports as a percentage 
of GDP rose marginally between 1953 (8.1 per cent) and 1957 (9.6 per cent) (Ranis, 1979: 211), while 
imports outstripped exports by more than 60 per cent throughout the 1950s (Ho, 1978, 115). 
Despite some tinkering around the edges to facilitate exports, it was not until the late 1950s that 
the combined pressure of the small domestic market, the continuing labor surplus, and the costs of 
developing new secondary import-substituting industries shifted the balance in favor of pursuing export-
led industrialization. Indeed, it is suggested that the shift may have been delayed by an allegation of 
administrative impropriety against Yin that caused him to resign all his positions in 1955, only resuming 
office again in 1957, a year after being cleared (Pang, 1992: 169).  Within a short time of resuming 
office, Yin was Secretary General of the ESB (1957-58), Vice Chairman of CUSA (1958-63), Chairman 
of the Foreign Exchange and Trade Control Commission (FETCC) (1958-63) and Chairman of the 
Board of the Bank of Taiwan (1960-63), thus putting him in charge of US aid, foreign trade and 
exchange, monetary policy, and economic development (responsibility for economic development 
moved to CUSA when the ESB was dissolved in 1958). Yin was the primary actor, and obligatory 
passage point, in developing and implementing the policy of export-led industrialization. 
Yin drafted the Accelerated Economic Growth Program (AEGP), the result of a collaboration 
between the policy makers and the US advisors. The US initiated the collaboration in 1959 with an 8-
point program, which Yin expanded to a 19-point program, of action. The resulting AEGP incorporated 
the 19-point program, along with the goals of the third Four-Year Economic Plan (1961-64). Amongst 
other things, the AEGP sought to create a business climate to stimulate private local and foreign 
investment, liberalize economic controls, liberalize exchange and trade controls, and promote exports. 
With the top leadership and the US government enrolled come 1960, Yin set about executing the 
program. 
Yin had the support of another actor, the consulting economists, in terms of liberalizing exchange 
and trade controls. While they played little if any role in formulating or executing Taiwan’s industrial 
development policy, their contribution, reflective of their neoclassical thinking, lay in advocating for a 
free market economy (Hou, 1985). The consulting economists made for helpful allies, as did the top 
leadership, when Yin commenced the foreign trade and exchange reform in 1957, which led to 
simplification of the exchange system, loosening of import restrictions, and the encouragement of 
exports. 
The state had attempted to attract foreign capital in the 1950s with the promulgation of the Statute 
for Investment of Foreigners (1954) and the Statute for Investment of Overseas Chinese (1955). 
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However, the conditions of the time did not attract a meaningful inflow (Lin, 1973: 85), while the state 
was under no urgent pressure to attract foreign capital given US aid. With US aid due to end in the mid-
1960s, policy makers became more focused on attracting foreign capital once again. 
The Industrial Development and Investment Center (IDIC), which was headed by Li, was 
deliberately established within CUSA, where it had the support of Ch’en as Chairman and Yin as Vice 
Chairman. With a brief to work on revising statutes and rationalizing administrative procedures aimed at 
improving the investment climate, the IDIC was given the task of drafting what became the Statute for 
Encouragement of Investment. 
Promulgated in 1960, the Statute for Encouragement of Investment provided a range of incentives, 
including: an incentive exempting productive enterprises from income tax for five consecutive years; a 
preferential income tax for productive enterprises not to exceed 18 per cent of its total annual income, as 
compared with 32.5 per cent for all other enterprises; an income tax deduction for profit reinvested for 
productive purposes; an income tax deduction of 2 per cent of export revenues; a tax exemption of 7 per 
cent of pre-tax profit against exchange rate loss. 
The consulting economists played a role in advancing export-oriented labor-intensive 
industrialization, arguing that this accorded with the country’s factor endowment and comparative 
advantage. Li pursued this line of thinking in driving enactment of the Statute for the Establishment and 
Management of Export Processing Zones (EPZ), 1965. Only welcoming enterprises creating significant 
numbers of jobs, the EPZ offered enterprises all the benefits and tax incentives afforded exporters, 
freedom from customs duties, and a single agency to handle official paperwork. 
The effect of these measures can be seen in the evolution of FDI (Pang, 1992: 217-20): FDI 
inflows were relatively small up to 1959, with greater amounts of investment arriving between 1960 and 
1966, followed by quantifiably larger investment from 1967 onwards. In terms of exports, they 
expanded at an average 24.5 per cent in the 1960s, equivalent to a nine-fold increase over the decade 
(Pang, 1992: 177). Thus, while exports accounted for just over 8 per cent of GDP in 1952 and rose 
marginally to 9.6 per cent in 1957, by 1961 they had climbed to 13.8 per cent and to almost 30 per cent 
by 1970 (Pang, 1992: 177). While imports increased with the removal of restrictions, their content was 
geared more towards production and exports. Finally, on the labor front, full employment was achieved 
by the end of the decade (Pang, 1992: 214). 
Overall, throughout our Taiwan story, we can see the primary policy makers, notably Yin, 
continuously presenting themselves as the obligatory passage point in advancing economic/industrial 
development, and working to bring identified allies – the top leadership, the US government, indigenous 
industry, foreign industry, the consulting economists – on board, and maintain their allegiance, in the 
endeavor. Institutionalizing industrial development is an ongoing process. 
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Concluding Reflections 
As the ANT analysis illustrates, institutionalization is both contingent and emergent. It is 
contingent in the sense that it is never fixed for all time, for the actor-network could come asunder 
should any of the actors defect. And it is emergent in the sense that the actor-network does not appear 
ready formed, as a pure essence that always-already existed. Looking through the lens provided by ANT 
shows that institutionalization is never quite static, never quite reified; rather the industrial development 
blackbox is opened and re-negotiated throughout both stories. 
What we also see through following the actors is that institutionalization is both a relational 
performance and a work of translation. Through following such performance/work, we see that 
institutionalization is an ongoing process and that, in this case, it was rare that we arrived at a unified, 
blackboxed actor. What we see is that institutionalization is a process of building associations, of 
materially heterogeneous actors performing relationally. Arriving at a (contingently) stable actor is to 
arrive at such a materially heterogeneous actor-network holding together such that it can be (temporarily) 
blackboxed and named. 
Moving away from what an ANY analysis allows us to see, the Irish and Taiwanese stories of 
industrial development also afford the opportunity for some reflection. As noted at the outset, both 
Ireland and Taiwan pursued state-led industrial development, first by way of import-substitution 
industrialization, followed by a turn to emphasizing export-led industrialization. However, how that 
industrialization happened and with what effects points to differences. 
Ireland started implementing import-substitution industrialization almost two decades before 
Taiwan, with the policy remaining in effect for a quarter or a century, yet the indigenous sector 
remained so weak that it was significantly affected by the removal of the protective wall. While 
government provided funding for modernization, this had minimal effect and was perhaps too little, too 
late. 
Since the late 1940s, policy makers had known that there was a serious problem with industrial 
inefficiency. The only significant intervention mooted was Lemass’ proposed Industrial Inefficiency 
Bureau, but this died with the election that brought in a change of government. Of course, policy 
continuity can be difficult in a multi-party democracy, where each election potentially brings a change 
of emphasis or direction. That said, in the Irish case, it is interesting that the thrust of industrial 
development policy since the turn to export-led industrialization has remained broadly consistent. 
Likewise, had the IDA been given the resources to fulfill its mission, perhaps a different, more 
robust pattern of industrial development would have emerged. Perhaps US technical assistance would 
have helped prepare the indigenous sector for the removal of protectionism, but Ireland could neither 
count on the assistance nor afford to pay itself.  All in all, industrial development policy through the 
period was rather hands-off, leaving it to the indigenous sector to its own devices within the protective 
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space provided by government. Thanks to the policy vacuum, emigrants ended up the collateral damage, 
on top of those impoverished by unemployment, while indigenous industry ended up playing second 
fiddle to, and the country has become highly dependent on/beholden to, FDI. 
As Girvin (1989: 207) has argued, opting for industrialization by foreign investment “led to the 
effective jettisoning of indigenous industry” and “to its marginalization within the policy process” 
because of its failure to meet national needs. As a result, the inherited and inherent weakness of this 
sector proved a stubborn and intractable problem that would persist into the future despite the efforts of 
policy makers. Further, as Telesis (1982) noted, while it made sense for a newly industrializing country 
such as Ireland to accelerate industrial development through actively attracting foreign investment, no 
country had achieved this goal without a strong indigenous industrial base. 
Certainly, Taiwan fits with the Telesis (1982) observation that achieving industrial development 
requires a strong indigenous industrial base. The Taiwanese case suggests to us that bringing about 
industrial development requires an autonomous state with the capacity to formulate and implement 
transformative policy effectively. Of course, state autonomy was grounded in the KMT not having roots 
on Taiwan and single party rule under conditions of martial law. As was demonstrated with the 
suppression of the 2-28 uprising, dissent was not tolerated. 
Taiwan was also the recipient of significant US aid over the period that saw it develop a strong 
indigenous industrial base before transitioning to export-led industrialization, albeit the bulk of 
incentives were afforded state enterprises and “cronies” selected to become industrialists (Gold, 1984: 
73). But industrialization came at a cost to agriculture (Hsiao, 1981), for as Amsden (1979: 362) 
observed, “a self-exploitative peasantry, working long hours to maximize production per hectare, and a 
superexploitative state, ticking along effectivelt to extract the fruits of the peasantry’s labour, operated 
hand in hand in Taiwan to great advantage until the late 1960s.” 
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